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SoLE BAsIS OF JuRISDIcTIoN IN CUSTODY LITIGATION
A Texas divorce decree awarded custody of the children to the mother
for ten months and to the father for the remaining two months of each
year. The mother subsequently remarried and moved to Maryland, and
her ex-husband settled in Kansas. In 1960 the father refused to release
two of the children from his custody at the end of their two month stay.
The mother, who had moved to Washington during the two month
interval, brought a habeas corpus action in Kansas seeking custody under
the terms of the Texas decree. The trial court granted the father's crosspetition seeking permanent custody. The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed, holding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to modify the
Texas custody decree since the children were not domiciled in Kansas.
Two justices dissented, contending that the children were domiciled in
Kansas while in the custody of their father and, that, even if they were not
domiciled there, under Kansas law disposition of a child can depend on his
physical presence in the state.' Tompkins v. Garlock, 189 Kan. 425, 370
P.2d 131 (1962).
Three bases for jurisdiction in custody actions have been asserted. 2
One group of courts holds that adjudication of custody requires in personam jurisdiction over the child's parents.3 A decreasing number of
courts, relying on the state's parens patriae relationship,4 premise jurisdiction on the presence of the child within the state.5

Other courts 6

1 See Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 Pac. 606 (1930) (implicitly overruled
by the present case) ; in re Bort, 25 Kan. 308 (1881) (dictum) (implicitly overruled
by the present case). But see In re Robben, 188 Kan. 217, 362 P.2d 29 (1961);
Hannon v. Hannon, 186 Kan. 231, 350 P.2d 26 (1960); Niccum v. Lawrence, 186
Kan.2 223, 350 P.2d 133 (1960).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
3 See Hampton v. Hampton, 220 Ark, 359, 248 S.W2d 360 (1952) ; Clemens v.
Kinsley, 72 Idaho 251, 239 P.2d 266 (1951) ; Avery v. Avery, 33 Kan. 1, 5 Pac. 418
(1885) ; cf. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), in which the Supreme Court held
that a custody decree was not entitled to full faith and credit because it was rendered
by a court lacking in personam jurisdiction over the parent against whom it was

to be enforced.
4 See Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 Pac. 606 (1930) (implicitly overruled
by the present case) ; In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308 (1881) (implicitly overruled by the
present case); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925) (dictum).
5According to RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 comment
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953), there is such a group of courts; however, the cases most
often cited for this proposition have been overruled, or such broad jurisdictional
claims were in dictum. See Eddy v. Stafer, 160 Fla. 944, 37 So. 2d 417 (1948);
Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 Pac. 606 (1930) (implicitly overruled by the instant
case) ; Re Irizarry's Custody, 195 Pa. Super. 104, 169 A.2d 307 (1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 928 (1961).
6 See, e.g., In re Robben, 188 Kan. 217, 362 P.2d 29 (1961) ; State ex rel. Larson
v. Larson, 190 Minn. 489, 252 N.W. 329 (1934). See also 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAws § 136 (1935) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 136 (3d ed. 1949).
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reason that since custody is a matter of status, 7 jurisdiction should be
based upon the domicile of the children. 8
Proper disposition of custody cases requires access to information
about the child, its parents, familial relationships, and all other facts relevant to the allegedly inadequate placement. 9 The presence of both parents
before the court may be required by due process 10 and is certainly helpful
in evaluating the truth of an unfitness charge. The presence of the child, 1
while not essential when jurisdiction is based upon in personam jurisdiction
over the parents, is desirable 12 to enable the judge to talk with him in
chambers.' 3 If the allegedly unfit parent and child reside in the community in which the court sits, testimony of friends and neighbors and
opportunity to examine the home will be available.' 4 Access to the
challenging party's residence is of lesser importance because the issue as
initially posed usually involves the unfitness of the parent with custody.
Finally, in the best interests of the child, multiplicity of litigation should
be discouraged.
Ideally, then, an action for alteration of a custody decree should be
brought in the jurisdiction in which the allegedly unfit parent resides with
the child; but in most instances the situation will depart from the ideal.
A court can always refuse to adjudicate a particular controversy for
reasons of policy and convenience or for lack of jurisdiction. 15 As with
other conflict of laws problems which arise when several states have substantial contacts with the facts or parties,'8 different custody controversies
7 See 1 EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 275-76 (1959); Goodrich, Custody of
Children in Divorce Suits, 7 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 (1921) ; Johnstone, Child Custody:
III Custody in the Conflict of Laws, 1 KAN. L. REv. 165, 166 (1953).
8 This theory equates a custody action with an in rem action in which jurisdiction
is determined by the location of the res. In custody the res is status which is located,
according to the courts, at the child's domicile. For a criticism of the domicile rule
see Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 819, 821 (1944); Note, Child Custody and the Conflict of Laws, 10 KAN.
L. REv. 221, 224 (1961).
9 See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958), in which the Court listed as factors
commonly considered in custody determinations, "age, health, religious activities, and
community interests of respondent; the suitability of his residence from the standpoint of size, location, appearance and equipment; the training and interests of
respondent's wife; the child's religious and scholastic record, associations, and health;
and the educational and recreational facilities available to the child." Id. at 610.
(dictum).
10 Cf. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1952)
11 See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Kovacs v. Brewer,

356 U.S. 604, 613 (1958), which criticizes adjudications made without the presence of
the child.
12 At times it may be desirable for the court to proceed in the children's absence.
Cf. Avery v. Avery, 33 Kan. 1, 5 Pac. 418 (1885). The experience of seeing his
parents fighting over him, albeit legally, may be emotionally upsetting for the child.
13 For a result of the in-chambers conference see In re Dubin, 201 Misc. 621,
112 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Dom. Rel. Ct., Child. Ct. Div. 1952).
'4 See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 614 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
See
also Annot., Jurisdiction to Award Custody of Child Having Legal Domicil in Another State, 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 13-14 (1949).
15 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 43a comment (Tent Draft
No. 3,
1956).
' 6 1n the instant case there were four states involved: Texas, Maryland, Washington and Kansas.
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require emphasis on particular contacts. Therefore, when several courts
can constitutionally resolve a given custody dispute, 17 each must decide
independently whether in the circumstances it should exercise jurisdiction.
For example, if there is strong indication that a return of the child to the
allegedly unfit parent-even for a short time pending another actionwould be grossly detrimental to the child's welfare, the court of any state
in which the child is present would be justified in exercising jurisdiction.
Although, in the present case, Kansas was not the state of the challenged parent's residence, both parents and the child were before the court.
Therefore, since the lower court clearly had the power to enter a decree
affecting custody, reversal must have been predicated on a policy that
custody changes should be adjudicated only by a court of the child's
domiciliary state. A more flexible analysis of factors bearing upon the
lower court's exercise of jurisdiction would have yielded a different result.
The children had never lived with the mother in the jurisdiction to which
she had just moved. To litigate in Maryland, where mother and children
last resided together, would now be impractical. Moreover, a Maryland
court would only have access to information about the family's past cohabitation, whereas a court awarding custody must be concerned about
future prospects as well. Neither the Washington nor Kansas court has
access to third party testimony and to the home in which the mother and
children have lived together. Nevertheless, the Kansas trial court properly
exercised jurisdiction for two reasons: the parents and children were before
it; and, should the mother be declared unfit, it could best investigate the
suitability of the father's custody-present and prospective. Furthermore,
to force the parties to litigate in Washington would unnecessarily subject
the children to another round of judicial proceedings.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-C I

THAT CREDITOR

DEVICES IN

STATE HIGHWAY RESPONSIBILITY ACT CONFLICTED WITH BANKRUPTCY ACT PROPERLY HEARD AND REj ECTED BY TH EE-JuDGE
DISTRICT COURT

A Utah state court entered a judgment against Kesler for negligent
driving. When more than sixty days had elapsed without payment, the
Department of Public Safety, in conformity with the Utah Safety Responsibility Act,' suspended his automobile registration and operator's license.
Kesler later obtained a voluntary discharge in bankruptcy and made a
written demand for reinstatement of his license, since the judgment upon
which the suspension was based had been discharged. This request was
17 See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

CONFLICT OF

LAWs § 117 comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).

1UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-14 (a) (1960).
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refused, and Kesler initiated an action before a three-judge district court
to test the constitutionality of the state act. This act directs the clerk of
the court to forward copies of unpaid judgments to the Department of
Public Safety only at the request of the judgment creditor. 2 It further
provides that the suspension remains in force until the judgment is satisfied 3 and that a discharge in bankruptcy does not relieve the debtor from
any requirements of the act.4 With the consent of the judgment creditor,
the Department of Public Safety may, in its discretion, allow the debtor
to drive for a period of at least six months, upon a showing of financial
responsibility. 5 But the creditor can force a new suspension by withdrawing his consent at any time after six months." The district court
rejected Kesler's claim of unconstitutionality, 7 and, on direct appeal,8 the
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the case was properly heard by a
three-judge district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958), 9 and that the
creditor devices in the statute did not place it in conflict with the Bank-

ruptcy Act. 10
(1962)."

Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153

The three-judge statute-28 U.S.C. § 2281-was a product of congressional indignation 12 over Ex parte Young, 13 in which the Supreme
Court held that a single federal judge could enjoin a state officer from
§ 41-12-13 (1960).
CODE ANN. § 41-12-15 (1960).

2 UTAH CODE ANN.
3

UTAH

4 Ibid.
5

UTAH CODE ANN. §41-12-14(b) (1960).
6 Ibid.

7 In re Kesler, 187 F. Supp. 277 (D. Utah 1960).
8
Direct appeals from district court decisions are authorized in certain cases by
28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958).
9 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958) reads:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer
of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order
made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes,
shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of
the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard
and determined by a district court of three judges ....
1052 Stat. 851 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1958): "(a) A discharge in
bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable
in full or in part . .. ."
11 Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Stewart dissented on the jurisdictional issue. On the merits, the Chief Justice dissented only on the ground that
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-14(b) and § 41-12-15, in so far as it alludes to § 41-12-14(b),
conflicted with the Bankruptcy Act. Justices Black and Douglas dissented on the
ground that all three sections in question were in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act.
Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the decision.
12 Illustrative of the congressional reaction are these statements: "[Olne federal
judge has tied the hands of a sovereign State and enjoined in this manner the great
officer who is charged with the enforcement of the laws of the State .... ." 42
"If these courts are to
CONG. REc. 4847 (1908) (remarks of Senator Overman).
exercise the power of stopping the operation of the laws of a State and of punishing
officers of a State, then at least let it be done on notice and not hastily, and let there
be the judgment of three judges to decide such questions, and not permit such dangerous power to one man." 42 CONG. REc. 4853 (1908) (remarks of Senator Bacon).
13 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. Its purpose was to
safeguard the states from having their laws suspended except upon a clear
showing of unconstitutionality and irreparable injury, and to provide a
prompt procedure for the making of that determination. 14 Since the concentration of additional judges can create a shortage of judicial manpower, 15 the federal courts have long given the section a technical construction and have developed several prerequisites for the convocation of a
three-judge panel. For example, the complaint must seek to prevent an
officer from implementing some general state policy,' 6 and the focus of
attack, except where administrative orders are involved,'1 7 must be the
state statute rather than the actions of state officers.' 8 In addition, three
judges are not required if the claim of unconstitutionality is wholly insubstantial,' 9 or if prior decisions make it obvious that the state statute is,
on its face, unconstitutional.2 0 Moreover, a district court may stay proceedings before it to enable the parties to litigate in the state courts questions of state law, the determination of which is preliminary to and may
render unnecessary the consideration of the constitutional questions presented.21 Recently, however, in FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Jacobsen,22 the Court would not go so far as to accept a proposal by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter that it declare only one judge necessary when a charge
of unconstitutionality is joined with a nonconstitutional ground of attack.
Another restriction developed which is difficult to explain in light of
the known purposes of section 2281. As a result of the language in some
Supreme Court decisions, 23 a belief arose that a three-judge court was
required only if a state statute was allegedly in conflict with some section
14 Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1940).
15 Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941).

'ld. at 251.
17 Three judges are required if an order of a state administrative body is claimed
to be unconstitutional, even though the state statute under which the body is supposedly acting is not challenged. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S.

290 (1923).
18 EX parte Hobbs, 280 U.S. 168 (1929).
19 Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933) (per curiam).
20 Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (per curiam).
21 City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959)
(per
curiam) ; Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 353
U.S. 364 (1957) (per curiam) ; Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943);
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
22 362 U.S. 73 (1960).
23
E.g., in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 76
(1960), the Court spoke of the alleged conflict with a federal statute as "the statutory
rather than the constitutional ground"; in Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 97 (1946),
it said "the complaint did not challenge the constitutionality of the state statute but
alleged merely that its enforcement would violate the Emergency Price Control Act.
Consequently a three-judge court is not required"; in Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S.
354, 359 (1940), it said "the supremacy clause gives superiority to valid federal acts
over conflicting state statutes but this superiority for present purposes involves merely
the construction of an act of Congress, not the constitutionality of the state enactment"; in Ex parte Buder, 271 U.S. 461, 466 (1926), the Court said "the claim that
the tax is void rests, not upon a contention that the state statute under which it was
laid is unconstitutional, but upon a contention that the statute is no longer in force."
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of the Constitution other than the supremacy clause. 24 Thus, if the state
statute was supposedly invalid because it conflicted with a federal statute,
one judge was thought sufficient to decide the issue, even though an
injunction in a supremacy clause case disrupted state operations as much
as any other injunction. Nevertheless, this separation of supremacy clause
questions from the other clauses of the Constitution was not completely
arbitrary. When one speaks of the unconstitutionality of a state statute,
his first thought is usually of a direct conflict with a specific provision of
the Constitution. 25 Moreover, in keeping with the Court's policy of limiting
the application of the section through narrow construction, one might argue
that there is less need for a three-judge court to decide supremacy clause
questions since there is less room for a single judge to implement his
personal notions of justice when considering a possible clash between two
statutes than when considering an "open-ended" provision of the
6
Constituation.2
This differentiation of the supremacy clause from other clauses of the
Constitution was accepted without serious argument until the present
decision. 27 Here, however, the Court has abandoned the supremacy clause
exception to the three-judge requirement. It holds that if a state statute
allegedly conflicts with a federal statute, a three-judge court is mandatory
when there is an immediate constitutional question. 28 Only if there is a
preliminary 2 9 point of statutory construction-either of the federal statute,
24
Even before these Supreme Court decisions, supra note 23, only one lower court
decision can be found which states a contrary rule. In Michigan Cent. R.R. v.
Michigan Pub. Util. Comm'n, 271 Fed. 319, 321 (E.D. Mich. 1921), the court said:
This injunction is not sought "upon the ground of the unconstitutionality
of such statute," in the more common sense of which we speak of unconstitutionality. That there is a conflict between state and federal law does
not always bring to mind the issue of the unconstitutionality of the former;
yet it is prescribed by the federal Constitution that it and the laws and
treaties made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land, and
it seems to follow that a state statute which is in conflict with a federal
statute, when the latter is pursuant to and within the power given by the
federal Constitution, is, in a very fair sense, unconstitutional.
This reasoning was explicitly rejected in Hume v. Mahan, 1 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D.
Ky.), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 287 U.S. 575 (1932).
25 Michigan Cent R.R. v. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm'n, sMpra note 24, at 321
(dictum).
26 Cf. The Supreme Court 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. REv. 81, 138 (1960).
27 See, e.g., Board of Trade v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 156 F.2d 33, 36 (7th

Cir. 1946), partially rev'd on other grounds sub norn., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator

Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) ; Andrew G. Nelson, Inc. v. Jessup, 134 F. Supp. 218, 220
(S.D. Ind. 1955) (per curiam); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Board of
Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 107 F. Supp. 521, 525 (D.N.J. 1952); Farmers' Gin Co. v.
Hayes, 54 F. Supp. 47, 50 (W.D. Okla. 1943); D. A. Beard Truck Line Co. v.
Smith, 12 F. Supp. 964, 965-66 (S.D. Tex. 1935) ; HART & WEcnSLER, THE
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 850 (1953).

FEDERAL

28 Instant case at 158.
29 The majority opinion is misleading in stating that, "Here, no question of statutory construction, either of a state or a federal enactment, is in controversy." Instant
case at 157. As Mr. Chief Justice Warren points out in his dissent, "The application of
the Supremacy Clause is increasingly becoming a matter of statutory interpretation."
Id. at 178 n.13 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The majority obviously goes on to construe both the federal and state statutes involved. See id. at 158-74.
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the state statute, or both-that must be decided before the constitutional
issue, is one judge sufficient. 30 If the present case had arisen under a
Financial Responsibility Act like that of Georgia,31 which makes no mention of bankruptcy, the situation would illustrate a state statute requiring
preliminary construction. A court would first have to discover whether
suspension applied to persons who had undergone bankruptcy proceedings
before it could decide the question of possible conflict with the Bankruptcy
Act. Previous to the construction of the state statute, there would merely
32
be a "contingent constitutional question."
Although the Court's treatment of the leading cases responsible for the
old rule is perfunctory, these cases can be reconciled with the instant case.83
Not so readily distinguishable is Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Jacobsen,34 a case ignored by the majority. That case concerned a
California statute which regulated the selling in California of avocados
whose shipment from Florida had been authorized by federal order.
Significantly, in addition to the supposed conflict with the federal statute
under which the order had been issued, the California act allegedly violated the commerce and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Although no preliminary construction of either statute was necessary, the
entire Court agreed that the supremacy clause issue, had it been the only
issue, could have been handled by one judge.3, There, as in the instant
case, the immediate question was whether a*state and a federal statute,
dealing with the same subject for different reasons, were in conflict. That
the Court so readily agreed that one judge could decide the supremacy
clause question demonstrates the influence of the former supremacy clause
exception; it is surprising that the Court should reverse itself on this point
without discussing the Florida Lime case.
The decision in the instant case is significant in several respects. In
overturning a practice of long standing,3 6 the majority found no persuasive
judicial authority to support its reasoning, grossly misconstrued the one
30 The majority does not use this particular word. It does say that a three-judge
court is not required for a "contingent constitutional question," instant case at 156,
and that a three-judge court is required when there is an "immediate constitutional
question." Id. at 158.
31 GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-605 (e) (Supp. 1961).
32 See instant case at 156.
WIn Ex parte Buder, 271 U.S. 461 (1926), the Court had to make preliminary
interpretations of both the federal and state statutes to determine whether the state
law was in the form of an option and whether the federal law demanded that the option
be explicitly stated before it could decide whether the option was consistent with
federal law. In Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940), the Court first had to
determine whether the state statute in fact taxed bank stock exempted from taxation
by a federal statute before it could determine whether the state statute was unconstitutional. The complaint specifically said, "If the valuation includes the preferred

stock . . . it is invalid .

.

.

."

Id. at 357. In Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946),

the Court first had to determine whether a federal statute applied to the states before
it could decide whether the state provision was consistent with the federal statute.
34 362 U.S. 73 (1960).
35 See id. at 76-77, 90.
30

See, e.g., cases cited notes 23-24, 27 supra.
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case it offered,3 7 and used a loose form of wording which seems, on its
face, inconsistent with what the Court in fact did. 38 The new rule is
technical, and the distinction it requires between immediate and contingent
constitutional questions may bring for the lower courts "additional confusion to an already difficult area of federal jurisdiction." 39 Since the
Court indicates that supremacy clause questions are to be treated like
questions under other clauses of the Constitution for the purposes of
section 2281,40 it should follow that in cases in which only the state statute
must be preliminarily construed before the constitutional question can be
considered, the procedure should be the same whether the state statute is
allegedly in conflict with a federal statute or with the Constitution. In
such a case, a single district judge will stay proceedings until the preliminary question is litigated in state courts. 41 The problem then arises
whether one judge or three will consider the case if it returns to the district
court. The logical answer is that although one judge stayed the original
proceedings, three judges will have to decide the now immediate constitutional question if the case returns. This answer, however, is not clear from
the opinion in the present case.
Similar confusion arises when a preliminary construction of the
federal statute might avoid any question of conflict. 42 In such a case one
judge will make the preliminary construction, and if this construction fails
to eliminate the possible conflict between statutes, there are two possible
procedures. The more probable one, since it is consistent with the former
cases which permitted one judge to consider questions of statutory conflict,43 is that the same judge will proceed to consider the alleged conflict
of statutes and issue an injunction should one be required. Such a result,
however, belies the assertion of the majority in the instant case that
supremacy clause questions are to be treated like other constitutional
questions for purposes of section 2281 44 and deprives the states of
the added security that section 2281 is designed to give them. This
procedure can, however, be reconciled with the Court's holding in the
Florida Lime case 45 that three judges must hear a case in which both
constitutional and nonconstitutional questions are presented. Such a procedure allows one judge to hear the entire case when it is possible that the
determination of the nonconstitutional question will eliminate the need to
37 In Query v. United States, 316 U.S. 486, 490 (1942), the Court explicitly
stated that the alleged conflict was not with a federal statute, but directly with the
Constitution, while in the instant case the Court attempts to use Query as an example
of a case involving alleged conflict between statutes. Instant case at 157.

38 See note 29 supra.

39 Instant case at 178 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
40 Instant case at 156.
41 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
42Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), is an example of such a case. See note
34 supra.
-3 See note 33 supra.
44

Instant case at 156.

45 362 U.S. 73 (1960).
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consider the constitutional one, even if it does not do so, while Florida
Lime only held that three judges must hear the case if they will be faced

with the constitutional question no matter how the other is decided.
The other procedure possible when there is to be a preliminary con-

struction of the federal statute is to have three judges consider the remainder of the case if there is still a constitutional question after disposition

of the preliminary point. This would be consistent with the desire to
conserve judicial manpower 46 and with the purpose of section 2281; three

judges would be summoned only for the immediate constitutional question
and the states would enjoy added protection from injunctions on the ground
of the unconstitutionality of their statutes. 47 If this procedure were
adopted, however, confusion would remain as to whether the other tvo
judges are bound by the preliminary construction of the first judge,

especially since such construction might largely determine the constitutional
issue.
Turning to the substantive issue, the Utah statute, like those in force
in twenty other states,48 differs from one upheld by the Supreme Court in

Reitz v. Mealey,49 in that it does not provide for the automatic suspension
of the driving privileges of defaulting judgment debtors, but permits the

creditor to initiate, lift, and restore the suspension of the judgment debtor.8 0
The majority held these differences to be "too tenuous . . . to reach
constitutional solidity." 51
The Supreme Court has often recognized the state's high degree of
interest in its highways. 52 Requiring financial responsibility as a requisite
3
for using the highways is certainly within the police power of the state.
As a general rule, the Supreme Court deems the determination of "the most
suitable restriction to be applied of those that are possible" to be outside
the scope of its proper function.ar Utah could promote financial respon48 See text accompanying note 15 supra.

See text accompanying note 14 supra.
See instant case at 165.
49 314 U.S. 33 (1941). The Court in Reitz refused to consider two amendments
to the New York statute which were the equivalents of UTAHr CODE ANN. §§ 41-12-13
and 41-12-14(b) (1960), discussed in text accompanying notes 2, 5-6 upra. The
Court did say, however, that "there is force in the argument that § 94-b, as amended,
in truth deprives the debtor of the immunity afforded by his discharge, leaves out
of view the public policy of the State or makes that public policy subservient to the
private interest of the creditor by affording him the opportunity to initiate, remove
and revive the suspension of the license upon terms as to payments on account of his
claim." Id. at 38. The four dissenters in Reitz based most of their argument on the
statute as amended. Id. at 40 (dissenting opinion).
50 Another difference between the two statutes is that the suspension under the
Utah act could be permanent, while under the New York statute it could only last
for three years. This, however, is merely a quantitative difference and was not
seriously argued by the appellant.
51 Instant case at 174.
52E.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523 (1959); South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938).
3
See E parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933) (per curiam).
54 South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190
(1938); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959).
47
48
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sibility on the part of drivers by requiring proof of such responsibility
before permitting the issuance of license plates. 5 Or the state could deter
financial irresponsibility without imposing a financial prerequisite to the
issuance of licenses by demanding strict accountability for any auto accident, at the cost of one's license. If a discharge in bankruptcy were available as a convenient antidote to the state's sanction, the latter approach
would be undermined. Drivers would be told, in effect, that they are
entitled to one good accident and a discharge in bankruptcy before they
must show their financial responsibility.55 Under such conditions the goal
of financial responsibility probably could be achieved only by a system of
mandatory insurance.
On the other side of the alleged conflict is the Bankruptcy Act, which
has two main objectives-to secure an equal distribution of the property
among the debtor's creditors, 57 and to give the debtor a new start in
business life.58 In light of its important purpose, the New York statute
upheld in Reitz v. Mealey 59 conflicted with the goals of the Bankruptcy
Act only tangentially,60 even though a tort judgment arising out of an auto
accident is a "provable debt" within the meaning of that act.6 1 In the
55 Two statutes do so: MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 90, §§ 34A-34J, -34C (1954);
N.Y. 6VEHiCLE & TRAFFIc LAw art. 6. §§ 310-21, 312(1).
5 An early evaluation of the problems of bankruptcy in this area is presented in
Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329, 342 (1932):
The discharge section of the Act drawn in light of economic and social conditions existing at the close of last century is serving a function which could
not be visualized at that time. . . . But the advent of the automobile gave
rise to problems sui generis. In the first place, . . . the impecunious owner
and operator appeared. In the second place, the widespread use and increasing
speed of the machines multiplied many times, to all members of society, the
risks of transportation.
For a more recent comment on the importance of bankruptcy to private persons, see
Nadler, Quo Vadis, 0 Ye Insolvent Wage Earner: Nine Out of Ten Bankrupts Are
Wage Earners,7 N.Y.L.F. 331 (1961).
57E.g., United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 31 (1959);
Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945); Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299
U.S. 445, 451 (1937).
S8E.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) ; Stellwagen v. Clum,
245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918).
59 314 U.S. 33 (1941) ; see note 49 supra and accompanying text.
60 No one creditor was given an advantage over another with respect to the bankrupt's property at the time of bankruptcy; and it has long been the rule that a
bankrupt will be held to a promise he makes to one of his creditors to pay a debt
released by discharge. Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913). With respect to the
debtor, he is free from the judgment debt so long as he does not wish to drive. If
his business requires driving, as in the present case, his disqualification from such a
job is but an incidental effect of the state statute.
Moreover, it has never been the rule that a discharge obliterates every remnant
of the debt. E.g., Zavelo v. Reeves, supra (promise to pay a discharged debt enforced) ; Moyer v. Dewey, 103 U.S. 301 (1880) (discharge is personal to the debtor) ;
Personal Industrial Loan Corp. v. Forgay, 240 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1956) (if discharged debt is not pleaded in suit it is waived); Eiffert v. Pennsylvania Cent.
Brewing Co., 141 Pa. Super. 543, 15 A.2d 723 (1940) (shareholders of bankrupt
corporation held liable for wages owed employees). For a general discussion of the
limitations of a discharge, see Rifkind, Discharge of Debts in Bankruptcy and Some
Problems Relating Thereto, 7 N.Y.L.F. 354 (1961).
61 Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467 (1925).
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present case the Court rejects the contention that allowing the creditor to
start the whole procedure makes the state statute inconsistent with the
purposes of the act. 2 However, a statute empowering creditors to decide
whether or not the driving privileges of the financially irresponsible are
to be suspended indicates that the state does not insist on keeping such
drivers off the highways. Therefore, the public interest argument, forceful
in Reitz, loses some of its strength. The function of the statute has shifted
from being a warning to drivers that, for the good of the community,
financial responsibility is demanded, towards being a device for the benefit
of creditors which, only incidentally, also serves the legitimate state end.6 3
Placing the initiation of the procedure in the hands of the creditor cannot
be justified, as the Court in the present case attempts to do, 64 on the ground
that it gives the statute increased deterrent force, since the creditor has
the same incentive to report nonpayment whether or not the clerk is also
charged with responsibility to do so. Rather, the Utah statute,6 5 by relieving the clerk of initial responsibility, merely removes one of two complementary methods of barring financially irresponsible persons from the
highways.
Nevertheless, there were administrative difficulties under the New
York act which are obviously absent under the Utah statute, such as the
revocation of licenses even though judgments have in fact been satisfied,
or even though the debtor has made some arrangement for settlement with
the creditor. 66 And under the Utah procedure the policy of deterrence is
still being effectuated; the state does have a significant interest in and
receives a benefit from the process. Since the Supreme Court does not
dictate to state legislatures which of two reasonable 67 means to the same
end should be adopted, the Court was correct in accepting Judge Learned
Hand's categorization of creditor initiation of suspension as a procedural
device which "merely relieved the clerk of an irksome duty." 68
The most repugnant feature of the Utah act is the section providing
for the automatic re-suspension of the debtor's driving privileges on the fiat
of the creditor after they have been restored.6 9 Once the debtor is per62 Instant case at 173.

6 3 The state also lets it be known that drivers will perhaps be able to forego
payment of more than one judgment debt arising from auto accidents before disciplinary action will be taken, since it is conceivable that creditors will not press their
initiative. Thus, one of the main arguments for this type of statute, see text accompanying note 56 supra, is weakened.
64 Instant case at 173.
See text accompanying note 2 supra.
65 UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-13 (1960).
06 In re Kesler, 187 F. Supp. 277, 283 (D. Utah 1960).
67 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
68 Reitz v. Mealey, 34 F. Supp. 532, 535 (N.D.N.Y. 1940), aff'd, 314 U.S. 33

(1941).

See text accompanying notes 5-6
69UTAH CODE ANN. §41-12-14(b) (1960).
supra. The district court, unlike the Supreme Court, did not consider this section.
In re Kesler, 187 F. Supp. 277, 281 (D.

UTAH

1960).

Court upheld the entire section. Instant case at 173.
entire section.

A majority of the Supreme

Both dissents attacked the

Id. at 179, 184. The provision allowing the suspension of the debtor
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mitted to drive, it is premised that he is financially responsible for any
future accidents. Consequently, permitting the creditor, for his own reasons, to restore the suspension serves no public interest.70 No longer can
the argument of deterrence, a prospective concept, be used, since the individual has presumably shown himself capable of meeting future judgments. His license is being suspended solely because he has not paid a past
debt which has been discharged in bankruptcy, and the payment of which
will not even incidentally effectuate a legitimate state policy. There is no
71
reason for the Court to uphold such a provision.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-IMPRISONMENT FOR THE "CRIME"
oF NARCOTICS ADDICTION HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Defendant was charged with violation of a California statute punishing
by a mandatory jail term the use of or addiction to the use of narcotics.'
The jury returned a general verdict of guilty after being instructed that
they could convict the defendant if they found either an "act" of narcotics
use or the "status" of addiction, in which case no proof of use was necessary. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that since addiction
was an illness, the statute penalizing it inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962).2
The eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
was adopted to prevent the Government from imposing punishments of
to be lifted with the consent of the creditor is consistent with the supposed purpose
of the act. The deterrent is just as great with this feature, the restoration is not
automatic-being in the discretion of the commission, and then only after a showing
of future financial responsibility.
701f the original creditor permission was based on a promise, given after bankruptcy, to pay the debt, the creditor could bring suit on this promise. Zavelo v.
Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913). Thus it cannot be said that the provision is necessary
to protect creditors from being duped into giving consents. Some provision for
restoration of a suspension might be necessary if the consent was given before bankruptcy, but this does not justify a provision which places no limit on creditor discretion.
71The suspension can be reinstated for reasons known only to the creditor. The
appellant might have argued that the provision violates the due process clause of the
Constitution in that it permits private individuals to initiate positive legislative action
and to make an organ of the state follow their bidding without any discretion. See
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
1 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721. "No person shall use, or be under the
influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics, excepting when administered by
or under the direction of a person licensed by the State to prescribe and administer
narcotics. . . . In no event does the court have the power to absolve a person
who violates this section from the obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail."
2 Justices Douglas and Harlan wrote concurring opinions. Mr. Justice Douglas
also joined in the opinion of the Court. Justices Clark and White dissented in separate
opinions.
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intrinsic barbarity.3 The Supreme Court has since expanded the scope of
the amendment, first by prohibiting punishments which are disproportionately severe in relation to the crime charged,4 and, recently by holding that
the mental suffering incident to a punishment could be of prime importance
in evaluating its severity.5 In the present case, the Court further expanded
the scope of the eighth amendment by holding that the illness of narcotic
addiction cannot be made a crime. The Court has thus shifted its focus
from the punishment inflicted to the conduct proscribed as criminal. 6 The
Court has, moreover, unequivocally applied the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment to the states by means of the fourteenth amendment,7
thereby abandoning its original practice of noninterference with state
penalties. 8 These innovations significantly augment the Supreme Court's
power to supervise state penal legislation.
Only a minority of states punish addiction per se,9 use of narcotics, 10
or being under the influence of narcotics; 1 1 all, however, punish possession.1 Most states have statutes providing for the civil commitment of
narcotics users who are incapable of abstaining from drugs without assist3 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 389-97 (1910) (dissenting opinion) ;

NORTON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNTED STATES 223-24 (1922).

See generally

Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 846 (1961).
4
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). This expansion has gained
wide acceptance. E.g., State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 353, 46 S.E.2d 273, 275
(1948); Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38, 43 (9th Cir. 1959) (dictum), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1960).
5
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-02 (1958) (penalty was loss of citizenship).
6In a rare precursor of the present interpretation, the court in Stoutenburgh v.
Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229 (D.C. Cir. 1900), invalidated a statute making criminal
the status of "suspicious person," declaring without elaboration that punishment
upon such a charge contravened the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment prohibition.
7
Instant case at 667. Forty-eight state constitutions prohibit cruel and unusual
punishment. Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 846, 847 n.7 (1961).
8 See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (fourteenth amendment does not
make the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applicable
to the states). In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462-63
(1947), the Court assumed that the fourteenth amendment applied the eighth amendment to the states, but this assumption was unnecessary to decision. Recent decisions
of other federal courts have not hesitated to incorporate cruel and unusual punishment into the due process restrictions upon the states. E.g., Johnson v. Dye, 175
F.2d 250, 255 (3d Cir.), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864 (1949);
Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943, 951-52 (S.D. Cal. 1950), rev'd on
other grounds, 188 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 962 (1951).
9
E.g., Iii- ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 22-3 (Smith-Hurd 1961); MICH. Comp'. LAws
§335.154 (Supp. 1956).
IOE.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §22-3 (Smith-Hurd 1961); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 780-4(r) (Supp. 1961)..
"lE.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 22-3 (Smith-Hurd 1961); N.J. REv. STAT.
(Supp. 1961).
§2A:170-8
12
ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAw 24 (1962); e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.

38, § 22-3 (Smith-Hurd 1961); UNIFORm NARCOTIC DRUG ACT § 2 (Supp. 1961)
(substantially adopted in 47 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico).
Illegal possession is, in practice, also a federal crime, since possession of narcotics
in containers without appropriate stamps is "prima facie evidence of a violation" of
federal laws regulating sale and distribution. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4704 (a).
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ance.13 The effectiveness of civil commitment is, however, severely limited
by generally inexact and often inappropriate commitment criteria,14 and by
5
an acute lack of the facilities necessary for treatment.'
Physicians generally agree that an addict's compulsive physical and
psychological dependency upon narcotics is an illness and cannot be
deterred.' 6 In the present case, however, the trial judge's charge defined
"addicted" only in terms of habitual use, without regard to loss of selfcontrol or degree of dependency upon narcotics.1 7 Although the Supreme
Court rested its decision upon a view that addiction is a disease, it too did
not attempt to define the point at which the use of narcotics becomes the
disease of addiction; thus it left considerable doubt as to the reach of its
decision.' 8 This confusion is underscored by the fact that the defendant
appears to have been a volitional rather than an addicted user.' 9 There
was evidence, nevertheless, upon which the jury might conceivably have
found that the defendant was addicted, 20 and the judge's charge permitted
a conviction on that ground. Moreover, prior California cases have con13 E.g., CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE

§ 5350-55;

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 50,

§§2061-69 (1954).
14 E.g., CAL. WELFARE & INsT'NS CODE § 5355 permits the judge to deny commitment upon submission of satisfactory evidence of the improbability that the person will benefit from treatment, or evidence of "bad character, apart from his
habit." Most addicts are of bad repute, The Narcotic Problem (Prosser ed.),
1 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 405, 528 (1954), presumably because of their propensity to commit
property crimes to support their habits, Finestone, Narcotics and Criminality, 22
LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 69, 71 (1957).
15
Estimates of the number of addicts in the United States range from 60,000
to more than a million. Cantor, The Criminal Law and the Narcotics Problem,
51 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 512, 519-20 (1961); Winick, Narcotics Addiction and
Its Treatment, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 9 (1957). See also ELDRIDGE, NARcOTxcs
AND THE LAW 74-78 (1962).
Because of the paucity of state institutions, id. at 113,
and the expense of private care, Winick, supra at 25, the major facilities for addicted
patients are federal hospitals at Lexington, Ky., and Fort Worth, Tex., which together
have only 1,574 beds. Id. at 23, 25. On the state and local level, "only one community (New York) has a narcotics hospital, and it is only for addicts under
twenty-one." Id. at 26. In New York, despite civil commitment legislation, no
hospital treats addicts for addiction, although they do treat them for diseases caused
by addiction. Gassman, The Problem of Drug Addiction, 6 CRIm. L. REv. (N.Y.)
17, 29 (1959).
16 See Cantor, supra note 15, at 522-25.
17 Instant case at 680 (Clark, J., dissenting). In California mere unlawful use,
regardless of frequency, has been sufficient to establish addiction. People v. Thompson,
144 Cal. App. 2d 854, 857, 301 P.2d 313, 315 (App. Dep't 1956). Although the
statute under which the Thompson case was decided, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11009, has been repealed and not replaced, the artificiality of the definition of addic-

tion is still apparent in the instant case.
18 Instant case at 667. Justices Clark and White criticized the decision for not
recognizing degrees of addiction. Id. at 680-81, 688 (dissenting opinions).
19 A police officer experienced in narcotics law enforcement testified that the
defendant "was neither under the influence of narcotics nor suffering withdrawal symptoms" at a time shortly after his arrest. Instant case at 662. Justices Clark and
White agreed that the statute had been applied constitutionally to the defendant,
since he was undeniably a volitional user. Id. at 681-82, 687 (dissenting opinions).
2oThe jury might have inferred that the defendant was helplessly addicted, on
the basis of the scars of past hypodermic injections, id. at 661-62, and the arresting
officer's testimony that defendant's eyes were "pinpointed and glassy on examination
by a flashlight." Brief for Appellee, p. 5.
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victed helpless addicts under the statute in question 21 and have clearly
defined addiction to include nonvolitional use.22 Consequently, the Court
was compelled to reverse the conviction.
The Constitution does not require states to adopt any particular standard of criminal responsibility when there is reasonable disagreement on the
exact definition of the conduct to be subsumed in the standard, as in the
case of insanity.2 3 But it is generally agreed that addiction includes those
persons whose physical dependence upon narcotics is evidenced by the
appearance of physiological withdrawal symptoms following sudden
abstinence.2 4 Although treatment of these physically dependent users is
possible, threats of punishment cannot deter their physiological craving 25
The present holding must at least require that such addicts be constitutionally protected from punishment. Theoretically, users not physically
dependent may nevertheless be psychologically compelled to use narcotics;
constitutional protection of these users must await general scientific agreement upon a minimal definition of their ailment.2 6 Meanwhile, by designating them "volitional," a state can punish virtually all habitual users not
physically dependent, on the theory that their resort to drugs can be
deterred. Such a statute could not be attacked for punishing illness and
would aid enforcement of narcotics laws by eliminating the difficult task
of proving actual use or possession within the jurisdiction; 27 it might,
21

E.g., People v. Ackles, 147 Cal. App. 2d 40, 304 P.2d 1032 (Dist. Ct. App.
1956), in which defendant was convicted of addiction although withdrawal symptoms
were present. Mr. Justice Clark's dissent thus appears incorrect insofar as he
asserted that California criminal law punishes only those "addicts" who are voluntary users of narcotics. Instant case at 679-83.
22 In McMurtry v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 180 Cal. App. 2d 760,
4 Cal. Rptr. 910 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960), the court gave lengthy consideration to the
distinction between the terms "habitual user" and "addict" as used throughout the
California Health and Safety Code, and concluded that "addiction" connotes "a
compulsive factor" and "a repetitious use of narcotics resulting in a condition which
destroys the power of self-control and creates a need therefor which may be satisfied
only by a continued use thereof." Id. at 769, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 916. (Emphasis added.)
23 See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952).
24 "There is no adequate laboratory test to confirm that a person is . . . an

addict unless he exhibits withdrawal symptoms .

.

.

."

Winick, supra note 15,

at 11. Cf. instant case at 671-72 (Douglas, J., concurring); Bowman, Some Problems of Addiction, in PROBLEMS OF ADDICTION AND HABITUATION 161, 163 (Hoch
& Zubin ed. 1958); Cantor, sipra note 15, at 516. Only opium-usually in the
form of morphine or heroin--can cause true physical addiction. Bowman, supra
at 163. Marijuana and cocaine are considered non-addictive since they do not produce
physical dependence and subsequent withdrawal symptoms. Cantor, supra note 15,
at 526.
25 Instant case at 674, n.2; Cantor, supra note 15, at 522-25.
26
For examples of the diverging and imprecise theories concerning the psychological components bf addiction, see id. at 524; Clausen, Social and Psychological
Factors in Narcotics Addiction, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 34, 43-46 (1957);
Winick, supra note 15, at 18-23.
27 A purpose of the status crime is to enable a state "to supersede its own
venue requirements" when it is difficult to prove the county of actual use. Instant
case at 6q6-87 (White, J., dissentinz) ; accord, People v. Lund, 137 Cal. App. 781,
27 P.2d 958 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1933). The status crime of being an addict
or an habitual user has been described as "another statutory weapon for use against
addicts, permitting apprehension and imprisonment without the formality of making
a case on possession or sale." Kinq, Narcntic Druq Laws and Enforcement Policies,
22 LAW & CONMIP. PROB. 113, 128 (1957). In California, upon observation of a
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however, face constitutional challenges for vagueness 28 and for exceeding
state power to enact criminal legislation. 29
If neither the illness of insanity nor the compulsive acts of an insane
person may constitutionally be punished,3 0 it seems inconsistent to prohibit
punishment of the illness of addiction while permitting the punishment of
the addict's use, possession, or being under the influence of narcotics when
his sole purpose is the immediate gratification of his own habit. Mr.
Justice White recognized the inconsistency of distinguishing the status of
addiction from the addict's use of narcotics but expressed doubt that the
Court would forbid a state to punish such use.31 If, however, legal restrictions on obtaining treatment 32 and lack of facilities 3 3 effectively eliminate
person in the status of addiction, a misdemeanor violating CAL. HEALTH & SAFETy
CODE § 11721, an arresting officer is constitutionally justified in searching for and
seizing illegally possessed narcotics, thereby enabling prosecution for illegal possession, a felony under CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11500.

See People v.

Holland, 148 Cal. App. 2d 933, 307 P.2d 703 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Brief for
Appellee, p. 14, instant case.
28 Other crimes of status have been attacked on grounds of vagueness.
See
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) ("gangster"). In Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 364-66 (1953), Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting, would
have held "dissolute person" unconstitutionally vague, although the majority disposed
of the case without reaching the merits. To overcome constitutional objections,
the status of "volitional user" would have to have a definition more precise than
merely the words "habitual user," which was held to be an insufficient standard.
McMurtry v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 180 Cal. App. 2d 760, 770, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 910, 916 (Dist. Ct App. 1960); accord, People v. Perreault, 182 Cal. App.
2d 843
29 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1960) ("habitually drunk" unconstitutionally vague).
Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the present decision on the ground that the
punishment of a mere propensity to commit the crime of using narcotics is uncon-

stitutional. Instant case at 678-79. Nevertheless, the status crime of vagrancy
has been upheld as an attempt to punish the "probable criminal" for his "condition,"
not for the conduct "characterizing such condition." District of Columbia v. Hunt,
163 F.2d 833, 835-36 (D.C. Cir. 1947). In any event, proof of the status of habitual
user relies upon circumstantial evidence of use. Instant case at 686 (White, J.,
dissenting) ; Brief for Appellee, p. 14.
30 See instant case at 668-69 (Douglas, J., concurring). A state's abrogation
of the insanity defense has twice been held violative of due process clauses of state
constitutions. Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931) ; State v.
Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910). Although a state may be permitted
wide latitude in establishing particular substantive standards for the criminal responsibility of the insane and procedural devices for effectuating them, see Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), the very discussion of the appropriate bounds of state
discretion in providing an insanity defense seems to presuppose that the defense
itself is required by the federal constitution. Similarly, when Mr. Justice Frankfurter asserted that the "denial of adequate opportunity to sustain the plea of insanity

is a denial of the safeguard of due process in its historical procedural sense which
is within the incontrovertible scope of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment," United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 571 (1953) (dissenting opinion), he too apparently assumed that the insanity defense was a constitutional necessity.
31 Instant case at 688-89 (White, J., dissenting).
32 Stringent federal and state regulations prevent addicts from procuring narcotics legally without entering an institution. Cantor, supra note 15, at 513-19.
In spite of a Supreme Court decision to the contrary, Linder v. United States, 268
U.S. 5 (1925), a current Treasury Regulation forbids the private prescription of
narcotics necessary for the treatment of addiction. 26 C.F.R.
151.392 (1961).
See generally Gassman. The Harrison Act and the Druq Addiction Problem, 7 CRnm.
L. R-v. (N.Y.) 21 (1961) ; King, supra note 27, at 121-23. State statutes authorizing treatment of addicts only in specified institutions include CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CoDE § 11391; PA. STAT. AmNr. tit. 35, § 780-8 (Supp. 1961).
as See note 16 supra.
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avenues for legitimate treatment or satisfaction of the addict's craving,
illegal possession and.use would appear to be his only realistic alternative a4
Punishing these compelled acts is therefore equivalent to punishing the
addict for addiction itself.3 5
Mr. Justice Douglas suggested that the legislative designation of
"civil" or "criminal" is of primary concern. 36 If the sole purpose of the
Court's extension of the concept of cruel and unusual punishment was to
ensure that no addict would be labeled a "criminal," then the mere inclusion
of civil commitment provisions in a state penal code 3 7 might justify a
holding that the intent of the confinement was punitive. 38 The seriousness
of the constitutional objection increases to the extent that punishment of
the illness predominates over its treatment, as might be the case if one
civilly committed for treatment of illness is imprisoned due to lack of
facilities, 39 or is treated in a manner patently inappropriate to his illness.40
Confinement also assumes a punitive character when the particular patient's
prospects for recovery are slim despite maximum curative efforts, although
other considerations, such as protection of society, may justify continued
"treatment" in this kind of case. Should the Court use its expanded
concept of cruel and unusual punishment to review the detention of such
patients, it would be assuming the laborious task of determining whether
individual confinements were punitive or remedial.
The Court's invalidation of criminal treatment of narcotics addicts
should accelerate current attempts to supply needed public facilities for civil
commitments. 41 It may also exert influence in other areas,42 such as
34 See Cantor, supra note 15, at 513-19.
35 Cf. People v. Ayala, 167 Cal. App. 2d 49, 56-57, 334 P.2d 61, 66 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1959) (dissenting opinion) (possession and addiction not severable offenses);

State v. Reed, 62 N.J. Super. 303, 319-20, 162 A.2d 873, 881 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1960), rev'd, 34 N.J. 554, 170 A.2d 419 (1961) (possession and addiction not severable
offenses). Similarly, it is arguable that the addict who is motivated to steal solely
to support his habit is worthy of non-punitive treatment. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 6.12,
3 comment at 31 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
6 Instant case at 676-78 (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Clark indicated
that "criminal" imprisonment may be treatment in some cases. Id. at 682-83 (dissenting opinion). Civil commitments have been upheld against contentions of cruel
and unusual punishment in cases dealing with the insane, Germany v. Hudspeth, 209
F.2d 15 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 946 (1954), and with the sexual psychopath,3 7People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 608, 4 N.W.2d 18, 28 (1942).
E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 6400-01, 6500-10.
38 See People v. Frontczak, 286 Mich. 51, 57-59, 281 N.W. 534, 536 (1938) (commitment as "sex degenerate" held a criminal proceeding).
39 See Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959), in which
the court held that due process had been denied an imprisoned sexual psychopath
because the "remedial aspect of [his] confinement" did not "have foundation in
fact."
40 In Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1953). the court did
not reach the question of cruel and unusual punishment because it held that the confinement of a sexual psychopath with the violent and hopelessly insane was unauthorized by the commitment statute.
41 See the discussion of the proposed program for provision of facilities by state
and federal governments jointly on a "grant-in-aid" basis in Kiih, A Prosecutor't
Thouqhts Cotcerning Addiction, 52 J. CRia. L., C. & P.S. 321, 324-27 (1961).

42 Extensions of the present decision might also involve state laws of criminal
responsibility and civil commitment in their effect upon the insane and the sexual
psychopath. See notes 36, 39 supra; cf. note 40 supra.
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chronic alcoholism, which is closely related in a medical sense to narcotics
addiction. 43 The reach of the prohibition against punishment should, however, be limited to sick persons who are not responsive to threats of punishment. Persons susceptible to deterrence, such as nonaddicted users of narcotics, remain appropriate subjects of the criminal law."

LABOR LAW-EMPLOYER'S USE OF LOOKOUT As BARGAINING
WEAPON HELD NOT AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTIOE PER SE
After good faith bargaining had reached an impasse, Dalton Brick &
Tile Corporation "locked out" its employees, although there was no immediate threat of a strike. The National Labor Relations Board held that
the employer had violated sections 8(a) (1) (interference with employees'
rights to organize and bargain collectively) and 8(a) (3) (discrimination
to discourage union membership) 1 of the Labor Management Relations
Act since the lockout would tend to discourage lawful concerted activity by
the employees.2 The Board also held that the lockout constituted a per se
violation of 8(a) (5) (refusal to bargain collectively). 3 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board order and
held that to sustain a finding of an unfair labor practice the Board must find
that the employer intended to infringe employee rights. NLRB v. Dalton
Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
43 See instant case at 667 n.8; Bowman, Some Problems of Addiction, in
PROBLEMs OF ADDIcTION AND HABITUATION 161-63 (Hoch & Zubin ed. 1958); The

Narcotic Problem (Prosser ed.), 1 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 405, 436 (1954). The enforcement of drunkenness statutes generally emphasizes the control of danger and annoyance to the public. E.g., MICH. ComP. LAws § 750.167 (1948) (drunk in public
place); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1221 (public intoxication). Contra, City of Cleveland v.
Davey, 97 Ohio App. 293, 120 N.E.2d 454 (1954) (defendant convicted of being
drunk in own home). However, the wording of some statutes would allow imprisonment merely for being an alcoholic. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 437 (1940);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 671 (1930) (habitual drunkards may be committed to
the House of Correction). But cf. In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 3 Cal. Rptr.
364 (1960) (statute making a "common drunk" a criminal held unconstitutionally
vague). The indiscriminate application of local "vagrancy-type laws" to habitually
drunk vagrants is the principal source of potential constitutional infringement in
this area, although court tests are rare because of the ignorance and poverty of the
violators. See Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 603, 631-33, 643-44 (1956).
44 See Cantor, supra note 15, at 526-27.
'National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a) (1), (3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (3) (1958).
2 According to the court, the Board reasoned that:
When an employer locks out his employees during bargaining, their pay
automatically ceases. The employees see that this is a result of advocacy
by the union of demands for increased wages or improvements. The union
is, therefore, directly responsible for the immediate economic loss. Consequently, this discourages membership in, and support of, a union.
Instant case at 895-96.
- National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958).
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The National Labor Relations Board and the courts have long differed
as to the legality of lockouts. 4 The conflict was readily apparent when,
contrary to the Board's position in Morand Bros. Beverage Co.,5 the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that lockout was a legitimate
employer weapon in a bargaining impasse.6 In NLRB v. Teamsters
Union," the Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the Board 8 and the
Second Circuit 9 in favor of the Board by holding that those members of
a multi-employer organization whose employees were not striking could
lock out their employees as a defensive measure to protect the integrity of
their association. The Court said that the "delicate responsibility" of
balancing the conflicting interests involved in lockout situations was committed by Congress primarily to the NLRB. 10
Although some language used by the Board in lockout cases gives
the impression that it has been inconsistent in its dispositions, a detailed
examination of the cases reveals a consistent balancing of the interests.
Although the Board talks of "economic justification" or "use as a bargaining weapon," its decisions are uniformly based on whether lockout is
used as an offensive or a defensive maneuver. For example, in Betts
Cadillac Olds, Inc.," the union struck the repair departments of two dealers
of a dealer association; the remaining dealers, who were under an imminent
threat of strike, were held economically justified in closing down their repair departments. The economic justification was the potential loss of customer goodwill that would result if the threatened strike rendered them unable to complete repair work. However, that loss is dwarfed by the possibly
devastating one in American Brake Shoe Co., 12 which the Board held did
not constitute sufficient economic justification for the employer's shutdown.
These seemingly contradictory cases are inexplicable on an "economic
justification" basis. Only when rationalized in terms of an offensive4 Students of the law disagree with both--and for a variety of reasons. See, e.g.,
Meltzer, Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley
Act, 24 U. CHIr. L. REv. 70 (1956) ; Koretz, Legality of the Lockout, 4 SYRAcusE L.
REv. 250 (1952).
65 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952) (dictum).
Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953) (dictum).
The Ninth Circuit was faced with the same situation in Leonard v. NLRB, 205 F.2d
355 (9th Cir. 1953). That court adopted the Seventh Circuit's dictum and held
accordingly.
7353 U.S. 87 (1957).
8 Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954).
9 Local 449, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir.), rez'd, 353 U.S.
87 (1957). The Second Circuit suggested that a distinction be made between single
employer and multi-employer cases. Such a distinction has never been made by the
Board. See note 13 infra.

10 353 U.S. at 96.

1196 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
12 116 N.L.R.B. 820, enforcemicnt denied, 244 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1957).
The
Company manufactured fixtures for railroad track on special order; an order took
thirty to forty-five days to complete. The fixtures were used in the laying of new
and the repairing of old track, work that could only be done by the railroads during
the warm months of the year; therefore, they needed the fixtures on schedule. After
two strikes against American Brake Shoe had delayed their operations, the railroads
threatened that another delay would force them to "split" their business.
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defensive dichotomy are they consistent. In Betts, the lockout held to be
lawful was defensive. The dealers would have preferred doing business as
usual, but took the unprofitable step of closing their repair departments
under an imminent threat of strike. In Brake Shoe, the lockout declared
unlawful was used offensively. Despite the magnitude of the potential loss,
the old contract had not yet expired and the company, by channeling orders
to those of its plants uninvolved in the dispute, lost no business and
encountered no additional expense. The lockout placed the union under
great pressure to settle the dispute. Other NLRB lockout cases can
similarly be reconciled under this offensive-defensive analysis,13 and the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Teamsters Union apparently adopted this
standard, at least in the context of that case.14
The usual justification for lockouts is that the use of competing economic weapons in collective bargaining fosters compromise agreements
between labor and management. Certain of these weapons have been
labelled unfair by Congress in the Labor Acts, 15 but lockouts are neither
specifically prohibited nor authorized.' 6 Therefore, lockout is arguably but
another weapon in the employer's arsenal that includes the right to hire
strike-breakers, to "farm out" business to other employers, and to stockpile
in anticipation of a strike. The latter weapons are, however, used only to
defend against strike or threat of strike; the Board, therefore, permits the
employer to use lockout only defensively.
The court in the present case did not attempt to analyze the Board
decisions, but premised its determination on the conclusion that Congress
has recognized the legality of lockout in certain circumstances. 17 Basing
13 Some cases where the Board has upheld the employer in the defensive use of
the lockout are: Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447, enforcement denied,
231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87 (1957) (non-struck employers in a multiemployer bargaining unit were justified in locking out their employees to counteract
the union's whipsaw strike) ; International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951) (single
employer operating three integrated departments was justified in closing two after
the union struck one); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943)
(union
struck one employer of an association and others had reasonable cause to fear a strike).
Cases in which the Board struck down the employer's offensive use of the lockout
are: Brown Food Store, 137 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (May 4, 1962) (employers were not
justified in locking out their employees and running their stores with supervisory
personnel); Anchorage Businessmen's Ass'n, 124 N.L.R.B. 662, enforced, 289 F.2d
619 (9th Cir. 1961) (employers of an association were not justified in laying off
only their union employees and running their stores with nonunion help); Quaker
State Oil Ref. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 334, enforced, 270 F.2d 40 (3rd Cir. 1959)
(single employer had no reasonable ground to believe a strike was imminent due to
union assurances to the contrary and therefore was not justified in his use of the
lockout).
14 See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text.
15 Senator Taft, in explaining the purpose of amending the Wagner Act, said:
"Whenever we found an injustice we tried to correct it ....
" 93 CONG. REc. 3951
(1947).

16 NLRB v. Teamsters Union, 353 U.S. 87, 92 (1957).
17

Instant case at 892 (quoting from NLRB v. Teamsters Union, 353 U.S. 87,

92-93 (1957)).

Nowhere in Taft-Hartley or in the legislative history of Taft-Hartley

is "lockout" defined.

recognized.

Therefore all that can be concluded is that lawful lockouts are

Nothing indicates that Congress questioned the Board's responsibility

to determine what was lawful. Apparently Congress did not intend to change existing
law as to lockout.
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its approach on two Supreme Court cases, the court then examined the
employer's conduct to determine whether there was substantial evidence
of violation of specific provisions of the Act.18 In the first case relied on,
NLRB v., Insurance Agents' Int'l Union,19 the Board held that the use of
harassing tactics by a union during bargaining was a per se failure to
bargain in good faith in violation of 8(b) (3). The Supreme Court, however, reversed on the ground that the use of economic pressure during
bargaining was not of itself incompatible with good faith bargaining; the
Board could find a failure to bargain in good faith only on the basis of the
union's conduct as a whole. This reasoning applied to the question of the
employer's duty to bargain in good faith, justifies the present court's
conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support the Board's finding
of an 8(a) (5) violation.
The other Supreme Court case relied on, Local 357, Teamsters Union
v. NLRB,20 dealt with the issue of whether a hiring hall agreement was a
per se violation of section 8(a) (3). The Court, relying heavily on statements of Senator Taft to the effect that hiring halls are useful in many
industries and not illegal per se,21 held that the Board must look to the
"true purpose" or " real motive" 2 of the parties involved before finding
a hiring hall agreement violative of 8(a) (3).23 However, absent similar
legislative history approving of the lockout, the "true purpose" test cannot
automatically be extended to lockout cases.
Nevertheless, the court in the instant case read Local 357 more
broadly by treating Justice Harlan's concurring opinion 2 4 as an elucidation
of the majority's intent. 25 Justice Harlan indicated that the "real motive"
test applied to all 8(a) (3) violations. 26 However, this "motive" test does
not differ significantly from the offensive-defensive test which has apparently guided the Board's determinations. In a defensive lockout the employer's "motive" is to protect himself by anticipating the strike; in an
offensive lockout the "motive" is to obstruct the employees' right to effective collective bargaining. Thus, if after Board application of the offensivedefensive standard, a court makes an independent evaluation of the employer's motive, it in effect substitutes its determination for that of the
Board.
18 Instant case at 894.
19361 U.S. 477 (1960).
20365 U.S. 667 (1961).

21

d. at 673-74.

22 The

Court's use of the "true purpose" or "real motive' test means that substantial evidence is needed indicating that the employer was actually motivated by a
purpose proscribed by the Act.
23 Upon a finding of an 8(a) (3) violation, the 8(a) (1) violation would follow
as a 2corollary.
4 Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 677 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
25 See instant case at 896.
26 The correctness of interpreting Local 357 this broadly is doubted. The majority

dealt with the problem narrowly and gave no indication that more was intended.
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Since, according to the Supreme Court, it is primarily the Board's
function to balance the conflicting interests in this area,27 and since no
clear answer to the lockout puzzle can be found in labor legislation or
legislative history, a court should overrule the Board only when a clear
abuse of discretion is found. 28 But the Board invites judicial intervention
by failing to articulate a rational basis for its decisions.

SALES-OFFEREE'S RESPONSE MIATERIALLY ALTERING AN OFFER
SOLELY TO OFFEROR'S DISADVANTAGE Is AN AcCEPTANCE COiDITIONAL ON OFFEROR'S ASSENT TO THE ADDITIONAL TERMS UNDER
SECTION 2-207 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Seller's form "acknowledgment," sent in response to buyer's order,
conspicuously stated on its face, "All goods sold without warranties, express or implied, and subject to the terms on the reverse side." In smaller
but still conspicuous type, the back of the form provided, "Seller's liability
hereunder shall be limited to the replacement of any goods that materially
differ from the Seller's sample order on the basis of which the order for
such goods was made. .

.

. If these terms are not acceptable, Buyer must

so notify Seller at once." Buyer received this "acknowledgment" no later
than he received the goods, which he paid for and used without objecting to
the terms of the "acknowledgment." When the goods proved defective, he
sought consequential damages in an action for breach of warranties. The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a directed verdict for
seller, holding that a purported acceptance which states a condition materially altering the offer solely to the offeror's disadvantage is an "acceptance
. . . expressly . . . conditional on [the offeror's] assent to the additional . . . terms" within the meaning of section 2-207(1) of the Uni-

form Commercial Code.' Consequently, when buyer assented by paying
for and using the goods with knowledge of the terms of the "acknowledgment," he entered a contract which included seller's disclaimer of warranties. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir.
1962).
See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
See Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40, 45 (3rd Cir. 1959):
Whether we would agree with the reasoning of the Board or not is unimportant. What is all important is the fact that the Board has courageously
and ably recognized its responsibility in this extremely sensitive field. It
has fully realized that each shut-down case must be decided on its own facts.
We think that it has properly performed its difficult assigned task. We are
satisfied that it acted according to law in balancing the conflicting interests
and deciding that the economic lockout in this instance was unjustified and
in violation of the Act. We refuse to disturb what we think has been the
exercise of a wise discretion by the Board.
See generally Koretz, The Lockout Revisited, 7 SYRACUSE L. Rxv. 263, 268-71 (1956).
27

28

1 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-207 (Supp. 1961).
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At common law 2 and under the Uniform Sales Act,3 a purported
acceptance which modifies the terms of the offer is a rejection and a
counter-offer. Although this rule is supposed to promote certainty in the
terms of the agreement, 4 businessmen frequently undertake performance in
reliance on the mistaken assumption that such an "acceptance" has created
a contract.5 Moreover, in the context of the modern business practice of
using standard forms to transmit and acknowledge orders, the rule encourages a "battle of the forms" ---a constant effort by businessmen to
gain an advantage in their transactions by qualifying their obligations by
means of forms containing unilaterally beneficial conditions. 7 In addition,
the rule provides a loophole for parties wishing to extricate themselves from
8
unfavorable deals which in commercial understanding have been closed.
Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code attempts to mitigate these
problems 9 by providing:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional
to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or
different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals
for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms
become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them . . . is given within
a reasonable time after notice of them is received ...
2

E.g., Nucla Sanitation Dist. v. Rippy, 140 Colo. 444, 344 P.2d 976 (1959);
Larson & Fish, Inc. v. Schultz, 5 N.J. Super. 403, 69 A.2d 328 (App. Div. 1949).
But see Valashinas v. Koniuto, 308 N.Y. 233, 124 N.E2d 300 (1954).
3 Section 73 of the Uniform Sales Act incorporates by reference the whole body
of basic contract law. HONNoLD, CASES ON SALES AND SALES FINANCING 14 (1954).
4 See Note, The Uniform Commercial Code and Contract Law: Some Selected
Problems, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 836, 853 (1957). Presumably this certainty stems from
the fact that no contract can be formed unless both parties have agreed to all of its
terms.
5 New York Law Revision Comm'n, Act, Recommendation and Study Relating
to Variation Between Offer and Acceptance in the Sale of Goods, LEGISLATVE Doc.

No. 65(C), at 5-6 (1960).

6 Compare Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619

(1915), with

FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW

178 (1947).

op. cit. supra note 6, at 178-80.
8 See Note, The Uniform Conunercial Code and Contract Law: Some Selected
7 FULLER,

Problems, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 836, 853 (1957).
9 See UNIFORM CO Mi RCIA. CODE § 2-207, comments 1-2.
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Generally under this section and the official comments thereto, a seller's
expression of acceptance which contains a disclaimer of standard warranties
would "materially alter" the contract; 10 according to comment 3, such a
term would not become part of the contract "unless expressly agreed to"
by the buyer." However, a clause limiting the buyer's remedy for breach
of such warranties to the replacement of nonconforming goods would not
be a "material alteration" 12 and would be included in the contract unless
13
the buyer objected.
The threshold question under section 2-207 is whether a seller's
response to a buyer's order is a "definite . . . expression of acceptance,"
thus making section 2-207 applicable. The court in the present case
ignored this question, however, jumping instead to the issue of whether
the terms of seller's "acknowledgment" materially altered buyer's offer
within the meaning of section 2-207(2) (b). Perhaps, since the Code
comments clearly characterize a clause negating standard warranties as a
material alteration, the court was induced to skip steps in its reasoning and
begin with the assumption that the section was applicable. Nevertheless,
whether a response is an "expression of acceptance" is a question so basic
to the proper administration of section 2-207 that courts should eschew
tacit answers to it. The purpose of this provision was to recognize as a
contract "a proposed deal which in commercial understanding has in fact
been closed." 14 The section was applicable to the present case only if
the seller's "acknowledgment" indicated that he intended to close the deal
and was merely adding "minor suggestions or proposals." 15 A determination of intent would have depended on such criteria as the phrasing of the
response, the conspicuousness of the words of acceptance in relation to the
new terms, and the extent of change which the new terms made in the
normal expectations of the parties as determined by their prior dealings
and the usages of the trade. On the basis of these factors, the "acknowledgment" in the present case probably did constitute an "expression of
acceptance."
A closely related question under section 2-207(1), which the court in
the present case reached only indirectly, is whether seller's "acknowledgment" was an acceptance "expressly made conditional on [buyer's] assent"
to the disclaimer of warranties under section 2-207(1). The sentence in
the "acknowledgment,"-"If these terms are not acceptable, Buyer must so
notify Seller at once"--could be interpreted as creating such a conditional
acceptance.' 8 If so, the "acknowledgment" was, in effect, a mere counter10

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207, comment 4.
11 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207, comment 3.
12 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207, comment 5.
13 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207(2) (c)& comment 6.
14 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207, comment 2.
15 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207, comment 1.
16The sentence in the "acknowledgment" was not as perfect an example of an
express conditional acceptance as the phrase, "I will not accept your offer until you
assent to the following." See instant case at 500. However, "[B]usinessmen cannot
be expected to act by rubric." Ibid.
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offer; but buyer's use of and payment for the goods operated as an acceptance which created a contract upon the terms of the "acknowledgment." 17
Conversely, if the sentence did not constitute an acceptance "expressly
made conditional on assent," a contract was created which did not include
the disclaimer of warranties, since section 2-207(2) (b) requires that buyer,
the offeror, expressly agree to material alterations of his offer.18 Buyer's
failure to object was hardly an express agreement.
Another factor overlooked by the court was that seller's "acknowledgment" not only disclaimed all warranties but also limited seller's liability for breach of warranties to replacement of the goods. Under section
2-207(2) (b), such a limitation of liability is an immaterial alteration that
becomes part of the contract absent objection by the offeror.19 Buyer's
suit was for consequential damages. 20 Consequently, even if the court in
the present case had decided that the disclaimer of all warranties was not
part of the contract, it could have held that seller had effectively limited
its liability to the repayment of the purchase price. Since the inclusion
in the "acknowledgment" of a term specifically limiting warranty liability
indicates that seller was aware that he might not succeed in unilaterally
disclaiming all warranties, such a result would not have been completely
contrary to his expectations. Moreover, this interpretation would have
permitted buyer to recover the purchase price and would have avoided
the harsh result of imposing a material alteration as a contract term without buyer's express agreement. 2 ' .
By restricting its opinion to the disclaimer of warranties the court
an
reached what it thought to be "an absurdity" in section 2-207 22-that
11 Section 2-207 does not specifically answer the question of what is the status

of an acceptance "expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms." Presumably it is to be treated as an ordinary offer, which may be accepted
by the original offeror's conduct See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§2-206(1),
As the court held in the present case, the buyer's use of and payment for
the merchandise was a recognition of a contract including the disclaimer of warranties.
2-207(3).

Similarly at common law when the original offeror acts upon a counter-offer, the
contract which arises is based upon the terms of the counter-offer. E.g., V-1 Oil
Co. 1v. Anchor Petroleum Co., 8 Utah 2d 349, 334 P.2d 760 (1959).

§ 2-207, comment 3.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207, comment 5.
The product involved in
20 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715(2) (b).
the present case was an adhesive for cellophane bags which buyer manufactured.
Although it is not mentioned in the court's opinion, buyer sought to recover for
credits which it was forced to extend to its customers when the bags failed to adhere.
Brief2 1for Appellant, pp. 15-17, instant case.
Although the court decided that the disclaimer was a part of the contract, it
never reached the question of whether the disclaimer fulfilled the requirements of
conspicuousness in section 2-316 of the Code. Indeed, the court never decided whether
the Code was applicable to this question. According to the court, which was applying
Massachusetts law, the place of contracting is the place where the last material act
occurs. Instant case at 499. Under the court's holding, this seems to have been New
York, where buyer consummated the contract by using and paying for the goods.
New York has not adopted the Code. However, even if the Code were applicable,
the "acknowledgment" met the requirements for an effective disclaimer of the warranty of fitness for purpose under section 2-316(2). The requirements for an effective
disclaimer of the warranty of merchantability were presumably met under the ex8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
19

ceptions
in section 2-316(3).
2
Instant case at 500.
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offeree is bound to a contract which the additional terms in his response,
being material alterations solely to the offeror's disadvantage, indicate that
he did not intend 2 3 To remedy this "absurdity," the court devised the
rule that a purported acceptance which contains terms materially altering
an offer solely to the offeror's disadvantage is "expressly made conditional
on [offeror's] assent to the additional . . . terms." Thus, the court
would, in effect, treat many responses containing material alterations as
common-law counter-offers.2 4 Since the addition of such terms operating
solely to the offeror's disadvantage would be a futile gesture unless the
offeree intended to make his acceptance contingent on the offeror's assent
to the additional terms, the court's rule probably reflects the subjective
intent of the offeree. Nevertheless, construing the section in this way
substantially reduces the scope of section 2-207(2) (b) and-in cases like
the present one-eliminates the requirement that an "expression of acceptance" must be made "expressly" conditional on assent if it is not to be an
"acceptance" of the original offer.
The concern of the court in the present case is not without foundation.
Inherent in any attempt to give effect, irrespective of minor differences
between the parties, to deals which in commercial understanding have in
fact been closed is the danger that people will be bound to bargains which
they never intended. If buyer offers to buy goods at $10 and seller
responds, "I accept but for a price of $50," it would be senseless to bind
seller to a contract at $10. In handling problems of this kind under the
Uniform Commercial Code, a court must first examine the specific facts
to determine whether the seller intended that his response should close
the deal, and thus whether that response was a "definite . . . expression
of acceptance."
By ignoring the logical starting point and neglecting
several grounds for decision open to it, 25 the court in the present case did
needless violence to the language and scheme of section 2-207.
2
3A similar, though less serious, problem arises when the offeree adds immaterial
terms to which the offeror immediately objects.
24 New York has reached a similar conclusion by statute. See N. Y. PERs. PROP.
LAw § 84-a.
25
In addition to the alternatives presented above, the court could have held that
the conduct of both parties recognized the existence of a contract which included
the disclaimer which, under section 2-316, became binding under section 2-207(3).

